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Deviations from aspirational target levels and environmental and safety performance: 
Implications for operations managers acting irresponsibly 
 
Abstract 
The relationship between sustainable operations and a firm’s financial performance has 
been an ongoing focus of operations management scholars. Previous literature has 
extensively explored the impact of acting responsibly on financial performance. This 
paper applies the behavioral theory of the firm and prospect theory to assess the much-
neglected reverse relationship, exploring whether a firm’s relative aspirational financial 
performance impacts its likelihood of acting irresponsibly. Furthermore, we explore 
whether operational slack in the form of capacity, productivity, and inventory attenuates 
a firm’s likelihood of acting irresponsibly when its actual financial performance 
deviates from its aspirational level. We use a matched pair design with privately held 
manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom who acted irresponsibly matched with 
similar firms who did not act irresponsibly. While most firms do not act irresponsibly, 
we find that the further a firm moves (positively or negatively) from its aspirational 
level of financial performance, the more likely it is to act irresponsibly. The results also 
indicate that slack generally does not prevent managers from acting irresponsibly, 
especially when performing relatively well. This study contributes to the sustainable 

















The operations management literature has for decades explored how firms can 
become more environmentally and socially sustainable (e.g., Klassen and Whybark, 
1999). Yet, a small but significant number of firms continue to take the risk of 
neglecting their environmental and social responsibilities (Pagell and Gobeli, 2009; 
Huq et al., 2016; Wilhelm et al., 2016; Jacobs and Singhal, 2017). Recent examples 
include sweat shop labor in Zara’s supply chain and Mattel selling toys coated in toxic 
paint (Burgen and Phillips, 2011; Wilhelm et al., 2016). The negative implications of 
acting irresponsibly, which include tarnishing a firm’s reputation, lawsuits, financial 
losses, and increases in the cost of capital, are well-known and apparent (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012), yet irresponsible behavior continues.  
Researchers in strategic management, finance, and marketing have explored 
irresponsible behavior from multiple perspectives, such as producing unsafe consumer 
goods, misleading marketing practices, and engaging in financial misrepresentation. 
Operations management research generally addresses these issues indirectly by 
including environmental and social concerns in research examining more responsible 
or sustainable behavior (Pagell and Shevchenko, 2014). The operations management 
literature has, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Jacobs and Singhal, 2017), not 
explored the drivers of irresponsible behavior. Our research focuses on irresponsible 
behavior by exploring the role of operations management in violating or breaching 




The behavioral theory of the firm (BTF) appears to provide an important explanation 
as to why some companies continue to behave irresponsibly. The BTF proposes that 
decision makers evaluate the need to change existing routines by comparing 
organizational performance with a target or aspiration level (March and Simon, 1958; 
Cyert and March, 1963; Desai, 2016). Irresponsible behavior could result when 
performance is not at aspirational levels. The BTF posits that the further a firm performs 
above or below their aspirational level, the more likely they will be to engage in risky 
behaviors, whether that risky behavior is changing the strategy; investing in new 
technology; or breaching environmental, health, and safety (EHS) regulations (e.g., 
Harris and Bromiley, 2007). For firms performing below their aspirational levels this 
is intuitive; their performance is (relatively) poor, and they need to catch up to avoid 
going out of business. In addition to being intuitive, this prediction is in line with other 
theories of firm or individual risk taking (Hoskisson et al., 2017).  
However, that firms performing above their aspirational levels would take similar 
risks is counter-intuitive. While this prediction does find some empirical support (e.g., 
Mishina et al., 2010), there are multiple explanations for these findings. The first is that 
firms performing above aspirations are hubristic and believe they can get away with 
actions others cannot (e.g., Tarakci et al., 2018). The second is that firms performing 
well, especially those doing extremely well, believe that future performance is likely to 
decrease, and hence they take extreme measures to avoid this loss (e.g., Mishina et al., 
2010). The hubris and loss aversion explanations are both about framing future 




overconfidence about future outcomes, while loss aversion is a form of pessimism about 
the future. In addition, the prediction that firms that are doing well will engage in risky 
behavior conflicts with other theories of risk taking (Hoskisson et al., 2017), such as 
prospect theory (PT), which posits that individuals (e.g., managers) are risk seeking 
when facing losses and risk averse when facing the prospect of potential gains 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
This disputed space has not been addressed at the operational level. Thus, we use the 
BTF and PT to explore the environmental and occupational health and safety aspects 
of irresponsible behavior to answer the following question: (1) How does a company’s 
performance relative to its aspirational level of performance affect its decision to 
breach environmental and safety regulations?  
In addition, we note that the choice of whether or not to breach regulations is likely 
a function of options. For operations managers options often come in the form of slack, 
and slack has been shown to predict the likelihood of accidents (e.g., Wiengarten et al., 
2017). If the predictions of the BTF apply to breaching environmental and safety 
regulations, then slack may explain why. Specifically, the presence of slack would be 
indicative of options. Firms performing below aspirations would explore breaching 
only if they had no other options, e.g. no slack. Similarly, firms performing above 
aspirations only breaching when slack is absent fits with the loss aversion prediction; 
firms with no slack perceive that breaching is the only option available to meet their 
future performance goals, and therefore a small number of them breach. However, if 




seem to be a more reasonable explanation for their irresponsible action. Thus, we also 
address the following research question: (2) Does the availability of resources 
controlled by operations managers reduce the chances of irresponsible behavior in 
situations when performance deviates from the aspirational level? To explore these 
research questions, we compiled secondary data collected in the United Kingdom (UK) 
from private manufacturing firms. We conceptualize aspirational performance in terms 
of a firm’s relative performance compared to both industry and its own historical 
performance (Cyert and March, 1963; Harris and Bromiley, 2007).  
We extend previous research in several critical ways. First, we add to the nascent 
body of research that explores the role of aspirational or relative performance in 
irresponsible behavior from the perspectives of the BTF and PT simultaneously. 
Second, our focus is on how operations managers respond to performance that is either 
above or below aspirational levels. The irresponsible behavior examined in this 
research is the breaching of EHS regulations. Safety and environmental management 
both occur in the operational sphere, meaning that the actions of operational managers 
would be directly related to breaches of EHS regulations, while the same managers are 
unlikely to have a direct role in behaviors such as misstating financial reports. Finally, 
by exploring the decision to breach simultaneously with relative performance and slack 
we provide greater theoretical clarity as to why firms breach, especially when 
performing well.  
The vast majority of firms do not breach EHS regulations. However, our results 




level of financial performance, the more likely it is to be one of the small number of 
firms that do breach EHS regulations. The results also indicate that the presence of slack 
generally does not prevent managers from acting irresponsibly, especially when 
performing relatively well. This study contributes to the sustainable operations 
literature and provides important theoretical, managerial, and policy implications. 
 
2. Literature review  
Behavioral theories suggest that individuals (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
and firms (e.g., Cyert and March, 1963) perceive performance in relative, not absolute, 
terms. And there is a robust debate on how gaps between relative and actual 
performance impact decision making (e.g., Tarakci et al., 2018). This research is largely 
framed with the BTF and PT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shimizu, 2007; Mishina 
et al., 2010). Conceptualizing financial performance in relative terms allows us to 
explore why we continuously observe cases of firms that are acting irresponsibly both 
when performing well or poorly in absolute terms.  
PT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) proposes that 
individuals frame gains and losses relative to a reference point (that need not be zero) 
and that losses have more salience than gains. Hence individuals are risk averse when 
they perceive a future (relative) gain and risk seeking when they perceive a future 
(relative) loss. In PT, the reference point is determined by the individual.  
The BTF also conceptualizes performance as relative, but in this case the reference 




(Mezias et al., 2002). Historical aspirations compare a firm’s present performance to its 
own past performance. Social aspirations compare a firm’s present performance to the 
performance of its industry peers (Harris and Bromiley, 2007).  
The choice to breach (or not) is a mixed gamble in that the decision has the 
possibility of both gains and losses (Martin et al., 2013). This is different from a pure 
gamble, where the outcomes will be either win/win or lose/lose. The possible outcomes 
involved in the breaching decision are the certain costs of compliance, the uncertain 
costs of being found in breach for non-compliance, and the uncertain gains or savings 
from non-compliance if not caught.  
Given the rarity of breaches, compliance is assumed to be the base or status-quo state 
for most firms. Compliance has a cost, but that cost is (much) lower than being found 
in breach. The likelihood of being caught while out of compliance is unknown. 
However, only a very small percentage of firms (2.5% in our sample in any given year) 
are found in breach. 
Our data include safety breaches and environmental breaches. The process of being 
found in breach is similar for both, hence for illustrative purposes we explain how a 
firm would be found in breach of safety regulations in the UK. In 2017/18, 70,062 
accidents were reported to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the HSE issued 
11,522 enforcement notices, and 493 firms were found in breach (HSE, 2019).  
The process of being found in breach starts with an investigation (typically of a 
major or fatal accident) or a random inspection. HSE inspectors and investigators assess 




the HSE’s enforcement management model.1 Most firms that are found to be out of 
compliance receive an enforcement notice. There are two types of enforcement notices; 
a prohibition notice is served when the HSE believes there is a risk of serious personal 
injury that must be remedied before work can continue, while an improvement notice 
gives a firm a set period of time to make improvements. Finally, in a small number of 
cases the HSE recommends prosecution and a criminal trial. A firm or its managers that 
are convicted in this prosecution will have been found in breach. Prosecution is pursued 
in extreme cases, such as when there was fatality resulting from non-compliance, there 
was reckless disregard of regulation, and/or repeated or persistent non-compliance. The 
HSE pursues prosecution only when it believes there is a reasonable chance of 
conviction of either the firm or individual managers. The 493 breaches in 2017/18 were 
the result of 517 prosecutions.  
The likelihood of being found in breach even for firms that are issued enforcement 
notices is very low. A firm’s perception of the likelihood of being found in breach will 
influence whether breaching is viewed as a potential loss or gain. For hypotheses 
development we follow much of the PT literature and simplify this mixed gamble into 
a win/win or lose/lose pure gamble (Birnbaum, 2006). 
A firm’s decision will depend on whether they frame the prospect as a gain or a loss 
relative to the reference point they choose (Hoskisson et al., 2017). “A reference point 







is a loss, exceeding the goal is a gain….the aversion to failure of not reaching the goal 
is much stronger than the desire to exceed it” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 302). This framing 
will be a function of the perceived likelihood of being caught if the firm breaches and 
how much the firm perceives compliance or getting caught to cost.  
This is still a simplification in that firms typically face a greater range of options 
than whether or not to breach. A key mechanism of the BTF is the problemistic search 
(March and Simon, 1958; Argote and Greve, 2007). The traditional view in the 
literature is that when a firm’s performance deviates from its previously formed 
aspirational level, it starts a problemistic search for actions and practices to help return 
to or exceed the aspiration level. Previous research has identified multiple actions that 
firms have taken as a result of this problemistic search, including innovation, capital 
investment, changing strategic direction, and breaking the law (Harris and Bromiley, 
2007; Tarakci et al., 2018). Each of these actions may entail higher levels of risk that 
firms are willing to take on in order to return to or exceed their aspirational level of 
performance (Bromiley, 1991).  
Our contention is that slack could be a form of options for firms performing a 
problemistic search. The decision of whether or not to breach is then a function of the 
firm’s current reference point, whether managers conceptualize the choice to be in 
breach and risk getting caught as an uncertain loss or uncertain gain, and the presence 
or absence of other options in the form of slack. We review the literature’s predictions 
for firms performing below and above aspirations and then examine how slack might 




2.1. Performance below aspirational levels  
Prospect theory, the BTF, and intuition all suggest that firms performing poorly will 
be unlikely to want to protect the status quo and be more likely to take risky actions. 
Some of these risky actions are perfectly legitimate or even necessary for firm survival. 
For instance, Tarakci et al. (2018) study the choice to change strategy in the face of 
performance that deviates from aspirational levels. However, other risks may be 
inappropriate or illegal (e.g., Harris and Bromiley, 2007). In this paper we explore 
whether a company’s performance relative to its aspirational level affects its likelihood 
of engaging in irresponsible and illegal behavior. We conceptualize irresponsible 
behavior as breaches of EHS regulations because these breaches would be mainly the 
result of choices made by operational managers, while other irresponsible behaviors 
such as financial misreporting would not be.  
Managing health and safety, ensuring that hazardous materials are properly handled, 
and so on are key operational responsibilities. When top management concludes that 
performance is below aspirational performance levels, they will search for actions they 
can take to improve performance. For a CFO the problemistic search might conclude 
with the decision to misstate earnings. Simultaneously, the COO and other operational 
managers would also be searching for ways to make an operational contribution to bring 
performance back to aspirational levels. Breaching EHS regulations might present a 
relatively quick and easy fix for the firm’s financial difficulties, especially when 
compared to many other levers available to operations managers, such as process 




small number of operational managers looking for ways to help their companies return 
to aspirational levels of performance may do so by breaching EHS regulations.  
Multiple studies have proposed a negative association between firm performance 
and illegal behavior. The broad argument has been that poor performance “pressures 
firms to find alternative sources of resources or to cut costs in ways that may not be 
legal” (Baucus and Near, 1991, p. 14). Research supports this supposition, and there is 
evidence that firms with poor absolute performance are more likely to break the law 
(Clinard et al., 1979), breach environmental regulations (McKendall and Wagner, 
1997), and have higher accident rates (Rose, 1993).  
Harris and Bromiley (2007) conducted one of the first studies exploring the 
relationship between relative performance and irresponsible behavior. They examined 
the factors that encourage a company to misrepresent its financial position. Building on 
the BTF they identified that organizational performance below aspirations increases the 
likelihood of financial misrepresentation (Harris and Bromiley, 2007). These findings 
also fit well within PT’s predictions about individual managers seeking risk when they 
expect future loses.  
The literature suggests that certain firms performing below aspiration can frame the 
choice to be in breach as a choice between compliance with a certain gain (of zero) and 
an uncertain but much larger gain for breaching but not getting caught. This small 
percentage of firms might also frame the same decisions as the choice between a certain 
loss (compliance) with an uncertain but greater loss (breaching and getting caught). 




breach. Such firms are aware that if they get caught, the costs could be very high, but 
“people become risk seeking when all of their options are bad” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 
279). The literature on BTF and PT both make consistent predictions that low 
aspirational performance can lead to risk-seeking behavior.  
Previous research has shown that comparisons to the industry are a more consistent 
predictor of irresponsible behavior than comparisons to one’s own performance (e.g., 
Harris and Bromiley, 2007), especially for firms performing below expectations 
relative to their industry. However, these results were for publicly held firms whose 
managers would need to be cognizant of how their relative industry performance was 
impacting share prices. In our sample of privately held firms, we expect that performing 
poorly regardless of whether it is relative to historical (own) or social aspirations 
(industry) would lead to irresponsible behavior. Subsequently, we propose the 
following:  
H1: The further a firm’s performance is below its aspirational performance level, 
the greater its likelihood of an EHS breach. 
 
2.2. Performance above aspirational levels  
For firms performing above aspirations it seems intuitive to suggest that managers 
will want to maintain the status-quo and protect the firm’s current wealth (Martin et al., 
2013). Yet the literature often finds the opposite (e.g., Baucus and Near, 1991; Harris 
and Bromiley, 2007; Kim et al., 2015), and there is literature on other forms of risk 




research provides support for both the prediction that firms performing above 
aspirations will be risk averse (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and that they will be risk 
seeking (Greve, 2003). And the explanations as to why they might be risk seeking are 
sometimes contradictory. The literature provides three basic explanations for how firms 
performing above aspirations would behave. Each of these finds some support in the 
literature.  
First, these firms are risk averse and wish to protect the status quo. Their goal will 
be to minimize losses and protect their current wealth (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Martin et al., 2013). Therefore, they will frame the choice as being between a certain 
loss (the cost of compliance) and an uncertain but larger loss (to breach). Firms who 
frame the choice this way will choose compliance for a very wide range of probabilities 
of being caught. Hence, even if they had no other options to improve performance, they 
would still take the certain but smaller loss.  
It is intuitive to assume that firms performing above aspirations would perceive the 
choice in this manner. However, some of the empirical evidence suggests otherwise 
(e.g., Mishina et al., 2010). The literature offers two main, but somewhat contradictory, 
explanations for why firms performing above aspirations are risk seeking and not risk 
averse.   
Managerial hubris has been posited to explain why some firms performing above 
aspirations could be more likely to breach (e.g., Mishina et al., 2010; Tarakci et al., 
2018). Hubris would change calculations on the likelihood of outcomes, with hubristic 




cannot (Mishina et al., 2010). When calculating each prospect’s likelihood, hubristic 
firms would reduce the likelihood of getting caught, hence increasing the expected 
value of breaching.  
Hubris can explain the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. 
At the time of the incident, BP was not struggling to survive. Quite the opposite: in the 
decade prior to the spill BP had been highly profitable and grown to the second largest 
company in the oil industry (Lyall, 2010). The spill had multiple causes (Neill and 
Morris, 2012). However, much of the liability has been placed on BP, whose poor safety 
culture and lack of emergency planning contributed to both the incident occurring and 
the amount of damage it caused (Neill and Morris, 2012). BP had other fatal safety 
incidents prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill. And after a fatal refinery fire in 2005 
BP was described as “…very arrogant and proud and in denial… It is possible they 
were fooled by their success” (Lyall, 2010). Pride and arrogance convincing managers 
that they can successfully do what others cannot is in line with the hubris explanation. 
The third and final explanation offered in the BTF literature is loss aversion (Mishina 
et al., 2010) and likely decreases in future wealth (Martin et al., 2013). Firms that are 
performing well, especially those performing far above aspirations, will perceive that 
their future performance is likely to drop or that they will not meet future improvement 
goals. Rather than the optimism of the hubristic belief of being able to do what others 
cannot, such firms are relatively pessimistic about their future. From an external 




decline. When searching for ways to continuously improve performance, firms will 
eventually run out of less risky options. 
  
“Consequently, the CEOs and managers of firms experiencing high external 
expectations are likely to frame the future as a choice between an almost certain 
loss if they fail to make changes or a chance to stave off that loss if they engage 
in riskier behaviors..”. (Mishina et al., 2010, p. 705)  
 
Compliance is then a certain loss, while breaching is an uncertain loss; hence the 
choice is made to breach. The loss aversion explanation seems to fit the Volkswagen 
(VW) emissions case. In the run up to the scandal VW was the second largest carmaker 
in the world, growing and highly profitable (Topham, 2017). Selling “clean” diesels in 
the United States (US) was key to reaching their goal of being the largest carmaker in 
the world by volume (McGee, 2018). However, VW engineers were convinced that 
emissions regulations in the US were going to be hard if not impossible to satisfy 
(McGee, 2018). VW would miss their goal if they could not sell more diesel cars in the 
US, but their initial search for legal solutions was not fruitful. The loss aversion 
explanation posits that when faced with such a decision, a firm whose performance is 
high is more likely to take risks (Kahneman, 2011; Mishina et al., 2010), such as 
installing defeat devices to avoid missing the goal, which is apparently what VW did.  
H2: The further a firm’s performance is above its aspirational performance level, 





Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the predictions of the direct hypotheses. 
The x-axis indicates the firm’s distance from its aspirational performance level (social 
and historical), and the y-axis indicates the likelihood of an EHS breach. The steepness 
of the three slopes (a = performance below social and historical aspirations, b = 
performance above social aspiration, c = performance above historical aspiration) 
indicates the hypothesized relationship between the likelihood of an EHS breach and 
deviations from aspirational performance. Previous literature suggests that the slope for 
below aspirations (slope a) is steeper than the slopes for above aspirations (e.g., Baum 
et al., 2005) and that the slope for above social aspirations is steeper than the slope for 
above historical aspirations (Tarakci et al., 2018). Firms take fewer risks when their 
performance exceeds their aspirational levels compared to when their performance falls 
below aspirational levels (Mezias et al., 2002); however they still take more risks than 
firms who are meeting their aspirational level (Harris and Bromiley, 2007).  
[Figure 1 about here]  
It is important to note that it is possible that a firm performing above (below) its 
historical aspiration can also perform below (above) its social aspiration. However, the 
majority of firms in our sample are performing above both historical and social 
aspirations or below both historical and social aspirations. We conducted robustness 







2.3. Slack and performing below aspirations 
Operations managers have multiple paths to performance improvement, and not all 
operations are equally efficient or effective. Nor are all means of improving operational 
performance equally risky, and operations managers’ willingness to engage in risky 
options is related to their relative performance and their options. Hence, operations 
managers in firms performing below aspirations would be more or less likely to breach 
EHS regulations depending on the availability of other options.  
In the operations management literature these options often come in the form of 
slack (Hendricks et al., 2009; Modi and Mishra, 2011). Slack is excess resources 
relative to the minimum amount required to produce a given level of output (Nohria 
and Gulati, 1996). A firm with excess capacity can increase output without investing in 
new equipment, while a firm whose workers produce less per hour relative to a 
competitor’s workers could become more productive without having to hire or add 
overtime. However, when plant and equipment are fully utilized, or workers are already 
highly productive, the system will have little slack, and increasing production will 
require investing in plant and equipment, hiring new workers, or cutting something else, 
such as the resources devoted to complying with EHS regulations.  
Reducing slack is frequently linked to improved operational performance (e.g., Modi 
and Mishra, 2011). However, reducing slack has also been linked to some firms 
increasing the risk of harming their workforce (Wiengarten et al., 2017). Firms 
performing below aspirations that have slack can improve operational performance 




workers and the system also increases, eventually leading to role overload, and some 
firms breaching EHS regulations (McLain, 1995; Landsbergis, 2003; Westgaard and 
Winkel, 2011). 
In our context this means that when a firm performs a problemistic search in an 
operations setting where there is excess slack, they can improve performance by 
removing slack. However, if there is little slack, they will either need to make 
investments in new equipment, training and so on or cut resources from elsewhere; in 
our context, a small but significant percentage of firms may turn to cutting the resources 
devoted to complying with EHS regulations. We test this supposition by proposing that 
firms that have slack are less likely to breach EHS regulations when performing below 
their aspirations.  
H3: Additional slack relative to industry averages can attenuate the likelihood of 
EHS breaches for firms performing below aspirations. 
 
2.4 Slack and performing above aspirations 
If firms performing above aspirations are more likely to breach, as predicted in H2, 
then the effect of slack on the relationship between performance above aspirations and 
the likelihood of a breach would depend on if this relationship is due to loss aversion 
or hubris.  Hence, competing hypotheses regarding the role of slack when performing 
above aspirations are presented. Mishina et al. (2010) suggested both hubris and loss 
aversion to explain their above aspirations results. However, they note they did not have 




to provide theoretical clarity here. Specifically, we posit that if loss aversion is the 
explanation for some firms breaching when performing above aspirations, then firms 
would only explore breaching if, after a problemistic search, they concluded they had 
no other options for improving operational performance. Therefore, if loss aversion 
explains the above aspirations results, then slack should moderate the aspirational 
performance breach relationship for these firms.  
H4: Additional slack relative to industry averages can attenuate the likelihood 
of EHS breaches for firms performing above aspirations. 
However, hubristic firms would be making a different decision. The hubristic firm 
believes that they can do what others cannot—in this context breaching without getting 
caught and hence avoiding the certain costs of compliance. In other words, if hubris 
explains why increased aspirational performance leads to an increased propensity to 
breach, then the presence of slack would not influence a firm’s decision to be in breach 
since breaching is framed as a highly likely gain, and they are not looking for other 
options. Hubristic firms could also remove slack if they had it, but they might 
simultaneously breach since both could reduce costs and improve operational 
performance.  
H4(competing): Additional slack relative to industry averages does not attenuate 
the likelihood of EHS breaches for firms performing above aspirations. 
We operationalize slack based on three main sets of resources operations managers 
have control over: capacity, people, and inventory. Decreases in slack are associated 





To answer our research questions, we compiled secondary data to create a sample of 
privately held UK manufacturing firms (UK Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] 
codes 10–33). We tested our model in the manufacturing sector because manufacturing 
firms are responsible for most EHS breaches. We limited our data to private firms 
because, while previous research on irresponsible behavior has focused mainly on large 
publicly held firms (e.g., Harris and Bromiley, 2007), most firms are small and privately 
held (e.g., Kull et al., 2018).  
The data came from three sources. Financial data were obtained from the Financial 
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database, the safety breach data came from HSE database 
of the UK government,2 and the environmental breach data were collected from the 
Enforcement Actions database operated by the Environmental Agency of the UK 
government.3 
The EHS breach data were used to create the dependent variable in our models. EHS 
breaches, unlike accidents that may be caused by worker behaviors or system failures, 
indicate that the firm broke the law and did not meet society’s minimal expectations. 
Breaches are very rare, but being found in breach is evidence of irresponsible 
managerial behavior and that senior management places a low strategic priority on 
protecting workers and the environment. We propose that irresponsible behavior in the 








deviations. The breaches occurred between 2008 and 2012. The financial data (FAME) 
was used for the independent variables, which have a one-year lag to the dependent 
variable. Thus, the financial data covered 2007 to 2011.  
EHS breaches are rare events. In our data the likelihood of a firm having a breach in 
any given year is only 2.5%. Thus, we reiterate that our subsequent findings are only 
representative for a small, yet significant, number of managers for whom the 
problemistic search ends in a breach.  
The probability of rare events may be underestimated using panel data and 
regression analysis (King and Zeng, 2001). Therefore, we followed the previous 
literature on rare events (e.g., Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Yiu et al., 2014) and created 
a matched-sample dataset, which is appropriate for studying rare events (O’Connor et 
al., 2006). This approach resulted in a sample of 374 firms, or 187 pairs, for the analysis. 
These firms were in 19 of the 23 two-digit manufacturing SIC codes; there were no 
firms in SIC codes 12, 14, 15, and 26.  
The sub-sample of firms with breaches is non-random. Hence, the matching firms 
were much more typical of the population. Our analysis does not use firms with missing 
data. There are 12,432 manufacturing firms in the FAME database, but only 2,724 had 
no missing data from 2007–2011. Given the large number of firms that were discarded 
for missing data, we conducted independent t-tests between the discarded firms and 
retained firms to examine whether the missing data are random or systematic. The 




(ROA) and sales (p > 0.1). Using only firms with complete data should not bias our 
results. 
We matched each firm that breached EHS regulations with a control firm identified 
as having the closest annual sales volume (in the year prior to the breach, t-1) and in 
the same industry (two-digit SIC codes) without a breach. The control firm’s sales were 
calipered within a range of 50% to 200% of the breach firm’s sales at t-1 (Barber and 
Lyon, 1996). The average sales are not significantly different between the breach and 
control firms (independent t-test: p > 0.1), which suggests that they are good matches 
(Harris and Bromiley, 2007). 
Of the 187 firms that breached EHS regulations, 33 breached environmental 
regulations, and 157 breached safety regulations, with three firms breaching both 
environmental and safety regulations in the same year. For the firms with breaches, 38 
had breaches in multiple years: 34 had breaches in two years, three had breaches in  
three years, and one had breaches in four years. Each year was treated as an independent 
event, and control firms were chosen on a year-by-year basis. In other words a firm 




The dependent variable “EHS breach” was measured as whether firm i has an 
environmental or safety breach in year t. Firms with one or more breaches in year t were 




consistent with the previous literature studying other forms of firm malfeasance, such 
as safety violations (Fan and Zhou, 2018) or financial fraud and misrepresentation 
(Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Yiu et al., 2014). Only 15 firms in our sample have two 
breaches in the same year, and there is only one firm with three breaches in the same 
year. Hence using a binary measure instead of the number of breaches also mitigates 
the potential bias caused by outliers or the distribution of the number of breaches 
(Franses and Haldrup, 1994). Each breach record was treated as equal regardless of the 
type of breach (safety or environmental) or the amount of the fine. This approach is 
consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Pagell and Gobeli, 2009; Lo et al., 2014; 
Fan and Zhou, 2018). Although the amount of the fine may vary, the breach itself is the 
critical event because prosecutions are very rare, and convictions indicate that criminal 
behavior occurred. Thus, regardless of the size of the fine, the firm has acted 
irresponsibly and harmed the environment or its workers and reputation. Additionally, 
individual managers are sometimes held liable for their actions related to the breach.   
Unless stated otherwise, all of the independent variables for firm i have a one-year 
lag to the dependent variable. H1 and H2 hypothesized that the more a firm’s 
performance deviated from its historical and social aspirations, the greater its likelihood 
of breaching EHS regulations. The aspirational levels serve as reference points for a 
firm to determine whether it has reached its performance goals (Bromiley and Harris, 
2014).  
We measure the difference between actual performance and the reference point, for 




(t-2 and t-3) (Harris and Bromiley, 2007). The calculations for historical aspirations are 
in formulas (1) to (4): 
 
Performance above historical aspirationsit-1  
= ROAit-1 – (ROAit-2 + ROAit-3)/2  if Performance above historical aspirationsit-1 > 0 
= 0                           if Performance is at or below historical aspirationsit-1 < = 0    
(1) 
 
Performance below historical aspirationsit-1  
= 0                           if Performance is at or above historical aspirationsit-1 > = 0 
= ROAit-1 – (ROAit-2 + ROAit-3)/2   if Performance below historical aspirationsit-1 < 0  
(2) 
The calculations for social aspirations are as follows (Yiu et al., 2014); the reference 
point is the average (mean) ROA for the industry (two-digit SIC code): 
Performance above social aspirationsit-1  
= ROAit-1 – industry average ROAt-1     if Performance above social aspirationsit-1 > 0 
= 0                              if Performance is at or below social aspirationsit-1 < = 0 
(3) 
 
Performance below social aspirationsit-1  
= 0                              if Performance is at or above social aspirationsit-1 >  = 0 
= ROAit-1 – industry average ROAt-1   if Performance below social aspirationsit-1 < 0 
(4) 
 
A “0” indicates that the firm’s performance does not fall into this category. For 
instance a firm coded as “0” for below historical aspirations would have performance 
that was at or above historical aspirations. Hence, the BTF would not predict that this 
firm would breach in the below historical aspirations model.  
The measurement of relative performance is a spline function in which the variable 
coefficient can change at a predetermined point (Greene, 2008; Greve, 1998). Historical 




consider both as salient, but that they need not be perceived identically. These measures 
provide flexibility and acknowledge the probability that firms may vary their referents 
(Bromiley and Harris, 2014). This approach has been widely used in previous BTF 
literature (e.g., Greve, 1998; Baum et al., 2005; Baum and Dahlin, 2007; Bromiley and 
Harris, 2014; Yiu et al., 2014) and allows for different slopes for performance above 
and below aspirations (Greve, 1998; Baum et al., 2005), which facilitates comparisons 
between the varying performance situations (Bromiley and Harris, 2014). Once more it 
is possible that a firm performing above (below) its historical aspiration can also 
perform below (above) its social aspiration. Thus, we include Table 1 to provide deeper 
insight into our sample. We identify that historical and social aspirations are generally 
consistent in terms of being above or below aspirations in our sample: 64.17% for 
breaching firms (χ2 = 15.12, p < 0.01) and 60.43% for non-breaching firms (χ2 = 7.80, 
p < 0.01).  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In H3 and H4, we examine the moderating effects of operational slack in terms of 
production capacity utilization, labor productivity, and inventory turnover. We 
operationalize these three moderators as follows. Capacity utilization was calculated as 
the value of the firm’s annual sales divided by plant, property, and equipment (Modi 
and Mishra, 2011). A firm’s labor productivity was calculated as the annual sales 
divided by the number of employees (Lo et al., 2014). Inventory turnover was 




These variables were standardized according to the industry mean and standard 
deviation (two-digit SIC code) in the same year (Hendricks et al., 2009).  
We also included a number of control variables to improve the validity and 
generalizability of our results. We controlled for firm size (number of employees) and 
firm gross profits by calculating the Berry ratio (gross margin divided by operating 
expense). We included these controls because firms with more employees and higher 
gross profits may have more human and financial resources available to operations 
managers looking to improve performance. Working capital was included to control for 
a firm’s liquidity for the same reason. It was calculated as a company’s total current 
assets minus its total current liabilities scaled by the number of employees (Fazzari and 
Petersen, 1993). We also included wages per employee and selling, administrative, and 
general expenses (SG&A) to control for the firm’s willingness to invest in their 
workers. We control for ownership (the percentage of top managers who are also 
owners) and compensation (wages paid to the top managers scaled by total 
compensation) to account for the links between the firm’s level of risk and individual 
managers’ level of risk. Having a stake in the firm would link a manager’s personal 
wealth and firm performance, thus the manager would bear a higher risk from 
organizational decision making (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). However, if 
decision makers are compensated mainly with money, the link between the firm’s level 
of risk and an individual’s level of risk will be weak.  
Finally, in a matched-sample design, each matched pair needs to be controlled for 




which includes regulation, macroeconomic conditions, and industry seasonality 
(O’Connor et al., 2006; Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Yiu et al., 2014). Thus, we also 
included dummy variables for the matching pairs. We performed natural logarithm 
transformations on firm size and wages to correct skewed distributions.  
 
3.2. Endogeneity 
Despite the multiple control variables that are included in the analysis, there may 
still be endogeneity issues. Endogeneity concerns may arise due to reverse causality. In 
our model, the independent variables have a time lag to the dependent variables. 
Therefore, the odds of reverse causality are reduced. However, endogeneity may also 
arise from the confounding effects of unobserved variable(s); the associations in the 
regression models may occur because both the independent and dependent variables are 
related to an unobserved variable (Wooldridge, 2015). For example, a firm with 
unprofessional management may have poor financial and EHS performance. Even with 
fixed effects included in the model to mitigate the confounding effects from time-
invariant factors, the risk caused by confounding factors might bias the statistical 
estimation (Ketokivi and McIntosh, 2017). 
We adopted the Heckman selection two-stage analysis to address this concern 
(Heckman, 1979). In the first stage (the selection model) we determine the factors that 
predict the probability of observations having a positive or negative relative 




calculated by combining ROA performance relative to historical aspiration plus ROA 
performance relative to social aspiration (Greve, 2003): 
Aggregate aspirational ROAit  
= [ROAit - (ROAit-1 + ROAit-2)/2]  +  [ROAit - industry average ROAit] (5) 
 
Formula (5) weighs historical aspiration and social aspiration equally. Observations 
with the aggregate ROA above aspirations (were positive) were coded as “1,” while 
observations with the aggregate ROA below aspirations (were negative) were coded as 
“0.” This binary variable is regressed on both firm and industry independent variables. 
To fulfill the exclusion restriction requirement of the Heckman two-stage analysis, at 
least one independent variable should be an exogenous variable and related to the 
endogenous variable—in this research, relative performance (Leung and Yu, 1996; 
Puhani, 2000). Therefore, we followed the previous econometric literature and used 
industry variables as exogenous independent variables (Reinikka and Svensson, 2006; 
Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Lin et al., 2011). Specifically, industry munificence 
(measured as industry sales growth) and industry concentration (measured as 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index [HHI]) were included. Industry munificence captures 
economic conditions, and industry concentration captures the competitiveness of the 
industry, which relate to the firm’s relative performance and are exogenous to the firm. 
To increase the explanatory power of the selection model, we also include the firm’s 
actual ROA, total assets (natural logarithm transformed), wages per employee (natural 




generates the inverse Mill’s ratio for each observation. The inverse Mill’s ratio is the 
probability density function divided by the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution (Chen et al., 2009). We then included the calculated 
inverse Mill’s ratio in our subsequent models for hypotheses testing to correct for the 
possibility of endogeneity. 
 
4. Results 
We conducted probit regression analyses because the dependent variables are binary. 
A separate conditional logistic regression was conducted as a robustness check (see 
Appendix B Table B). We used Stata 14.0 to test our hypotheses. The descriptive 
statistics and correlations are presented in Table 2. The average variance inflation factor 
(VIF) of the variables is 1.28. The maximum VIF of random variables is 1.66. Thus, 
collinearity should not be a serious concern in our analysis.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 displays the results of the probit regression analysis used to test H1 and H2. 
Model 1 includes all of the control variables, the inverse Mill’s ratio, and the direct 
effects of the three moderators. The omnibus test shows that the variables create 
satisfactory controls (Chi2 = 97.14, p < .01). The coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio 
is significant (9.801, p < .01), which suggests that endogeneity could bias our results if 
the inverse Mill’s ratio was not included. 





We added performance below historical and social aspirations into Models 2 and 3, 
respectively, to examine H1. The coefficient of below historical aspiration is 
significantly negative (-9.715, p < .01), and the coefficient of below social aspiration is 
also significantly negative (-10.279, p < .01). Thus, the more some companies slip in 
terms of their performance below their historical and social aspirations, the higher their 
likelihood of breaching. For a firm with an ROA lower than its average ROA (its 
historical aspiration) in the previous two years, when holding other variables at zero, a 
further 0.1% decrease in ROA increases the likelihood of the firm breaching EHS 
regulations by 0.972%,4 once more noting that breaches overall are very rare. Similarly, 
for a firm with an ROA lower than the industry average ROA (its social aspiration), a 
further 0.1% decrease in ROA increases the likelihood of the firm breaching EHS 
regulations by 1.03%. These results support H1. 
To examine H2, we added performance above historical and social aspirations into 
Models 4 and 5, respectively. The coefficient of ROA above historical aspiration is 
significantly positive (6.635, p < .01), and the coefficient of ROA above social 
aspiration is also significantly positive (12.765, p < .01). Thus, the more companies are 
performing above their historical and social aspirations, the higher their likelihood of 
breaching. For a firm with an ROA higher than their average ROA in the previous two 
years, when holding other variables at zero, a further 0.1% increase in ROA increases 
the likelihood of the firm breaching EHS regulations by 0.664%. Similarly, for a firm 
with an ROA higher than the industry average ROA, a further 0.1% increase in ROA 
																																																								




increases the likelihood of the firm breaching EHS regulations by 1.277%. These results 
support H2. The goodness-of-fit for Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 are significantly improved 
compared to Model 1 (p < 0.01). 
The results in Table 2 support our direct hypotheses (H1 and H2). These findings 
are visualized in Figure 2. Similar shapes have been observed in other studies applying 
the BTF (e.g., Greve, 1998; Baum et al., 2005). There is a significant difference 
between the slopes for above social and above historical, while the other slopes are not 
significantly different from each other. The weakest (but still significant effect) is for 
above historical aspirations, and above social aspirations is the strongest effect. That 
the effects of deviations from social performance are stronger is in line with the 
previous literature (e.g., Tarakci et al., 2018) and our initial model in Figure 1. 
However, the literature suggested the effects would be strongest for below aspirational 
performance and weakest for above historical aspirations (e.g., Baum et al., 2005).  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Slack resources are a form of options, hence H3 predicts that firms performing below 
their historical or social aspirations that have access to slack resources will, all things 
being equal, be less likely to breach EHS regulations than firms with the same level of 
aspirational performance without access to these resources. To test H3, interaction 
terms were added to the probit regressions to examine the moderating effects of 
operational slack on the relationship between EHS breaches and ROA below historical 
aspiration (Table 4) and social aspiration (Table 5). Figures A, B, C, E, and F in 




[Tables 4-5 about here] 
The results are mixed providing evidence to support or reject H3. Specifically, 
inventory slack attenuates the likelihood of a breach for firms performing below 
historical and social aspirations (p < 0.01). Labor slack attenuates the likelihood of a 
breach for firms performing below social aspirations (p < 0.01) but not historical 
aspirations (p > 0.1). However, capacity slack amplifies the likelihood of a breach for 
firms performing below historical and social aspirations. 
Hypothesis four was formulated as competing hypotheses to explore the somewhat 
contradictory explanations offered in the literature for firms breaching when 
performing  above aspiration. To test H4, interaction terms were added to the probit 
regressions to examine the moderating effects of operational slack on the relationship 
between EHS breaches and ROA above historical aspirations (Table 6) and social 
aspirations (Table 7). Figures D and G in Appendix A illustrate the slopes of the 
significant moderation effects. 
[Tables 6-7 about here] 
Five of the six tests show that for firms performing above aspirations, the presence of 
slack either does not influence the propensity to breach (p < 0.1) or even increases it 
(inventory in the above historical model). The only result that does not fit this pattern 
is that, for firms performing above historical aspirations, the presence of capacity 
utilization slack can reduce the propensity to breach (p < 0.05). Hence, loss aversion 
does not seem to explain why operations managers in firms performing above 




assumption that one is smarter than others, so hubris would be most likely to occur 
when making social comparisons, and the results are unambiguous for above social 
aspirations. These results lead us to suggest that the hubris explanation is the best fit 
for our results. Secondary data cannot confirm that hubris is directing the observed 
relationships, but the results for above aspirational performance are much more in line 
with hubris than loss aversion.  
The moderation tests for slack require some interpterion and are different depending 
on a firm’s relative performance. Based on these tests (see Table 8 for a summary) we 
come to three conclusions. First, for firms performing above aspirations, the most likely 
explanation for breaching is hubris. Second, for firms performing below aspirations, 
slack matters, but the relationships are complicated. Finally, the overall results suggest 
that the role of slack in the decision to breach is highly contingent on the type of slack 
and aspirational performance.  
[Table 8 about here] 
 
4.1 Robustness checks 
We conducted a number of additional tests to examine the validity and boundaries 
of our results (see Appendix B). The robustness checks suggest that our results are not 
impacted by testing individual splines as opposed to testing a U-shaped function (Table 
A), including or excluding firms with more than one breach either in the same or 
multiple years (Tables B and C), differences between small and large firms (Table D), 




has consistent or inconsistent historical and social aspirational performance (Tables H 
and I). However, there are differences between firms with a single facility and firms 
with multiple facilities (Table E). Specifically, firms with a single facility are generally 
more likely to breach the more performance deviates from aspirational levels. However, 
for firms with multiple facilities this relationship only holds when performance is above 
aspirational levels. The robustness checks suggest that our main results are valid while 
also providing interesting and important additional insights into the role of having 
multiple facilities.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that in general the further a firm was from its 
aspirational level of performance, the more likely it would be to breach EHS 
regulations. These predictions are supported for the small yet significant number of 
firms that breached. Figure 1 posited that the slope for below aspirational performance 
would be steeper than the slope for above aspirational performance and that the slope 
for above social aspirational performance would be steeper than the slope for above 
historical aspirational performance. The results support the conjecture that social 
comparisons matter most when performing above aspirations, but the differences 
between the other slopes are insignificant. These results could be due to the operational 
focus of the research, exploring private not public firms, the UK context, or some 
combination. Future research will need to explore these differences to understand what 




These findings are generally in line with previous research using the BTF at the firm 
level of analysis to explore risky behavior, specifically in terms of financial decision 
making (Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Mishina et al., 2010; Tarakci et al., 2018). EHS 
breaches emanate from the operations function and the findings indicate that when a 
firm’s operations managers are faced with deviations from aspirational performance, 
they, like other managers, will be more likely to engage in irresponsible behavior as the 
distance from the aspiration grows. Our first key finding is then to confirm that 
operations managers behave in a manner that is similar to other managers.  
Our research differed not just in operational focus but also in looking only at 
privately held firms. The strong support for H1 and H2 indicates that managers in 
privately held firms behave in a similar manner when performance deviates from 
aspirational levels. Our second key finding is then that operations managers in private 
firms behave in highly similar, but not identical, ways to their counterparts in other 
functions of public firms. Future research should explore whether the small differences 
we see are due to the locus of the irresponsible behavior being in the operations or the 
private nature of the firms.  
The robustness checks suggest that our results are valid and reliable. But the 
exploration of single and multiple location firms leads to our third key conclusion that 
the structure of the operations, at least in terms of the number of locations, impacts 
decision making.  
The tests of H1 and H2 also exposed some interesting results related to the control 




and administrative expenses are significantly positive (p < 0.01, Table 3). Large firms 
and firms spending more resources on administration may have more complex 
operations, which could increase the likelihood of accidents and breaches (e.g., Lo et 
al., 2014). However, these firms could also be more visible and hence more likely to be 
inspected or investigated. Future research should explore these possibilities. The 
coefficient of wages per employee is significantly negative (p < 0.05, Table 3). Wages 
per employee are indicative of investments in human capital, which have been linked 
to a decreased tendency to put workers at risk (Pagell et al., 2018). Future research 
should use more precise measures of investments in the workforce to determine if this 
conjecture is valid.  
While H1 and H2 were confirmatory in nature, H3 and H4, the hypotheses on slack, 
were exploratory. The overall results for H3 and H4 suggest that the role of slack is 
complicated and dependent on whether the firm is performing above or below 
aspirations. For firms performing below aspirations (H3) the presence or absence of 
slack does seem to matter in the decision to breach, but not necessarily in the predicted 
manner. Specifically, inventory slack reduces the likelihood of a breach for firms 
performing below historical and social aspirations. Likewise, labor slack reduces the 
likelihood of a breach for firms performing below social aspirations; however not 
historical aspirations. Counterintuitively, capacity slack amplifies the likelihood of a 
breach for firms performing below historical and social aspirations. 
Our fourth key finding is that resources under the control of operations managers 




to breach EHS regulations, but future research is needed to determine if the patterns 
observed in this research occur in a wider population, and if so why.  
Our fifth key finding is that we find very limited evidence (1/6 tests, Table 8) to 
support the loss aversion explanation for why firms performing above aspirations might 
breach EHS regulations. Instead, hubris seems to be the best explanation as to why 
firms performing well breach. Firms performing above social aspirations are most 
likely to breach (from H2), and the presence of slack does not change their behavior 
(Table 7). The results for performance above historical aspirations are similar, but the 
direct relationship is weakest for above historical aspirations, and the role of slack for 
these firms is also not as clear cut as for the firms performing above social aspirations 
(Table 6). Hubris is most likely to occur in social comparisons, which is what we 
observed. This result directly addresses some of the confusion in the BTF literature, but 
future research will need to replicate this finding and test it outside the operational 
realm.  
Our sixth key finding is that operations management research needs to explore the 
role of slack in much more detail. The results for slack are complicated and based on 
relatively small samples of companies with extreme behavior, so we are careful to offer 
the following as possible explanations, which need to be explored in future 
research. While the results for the individual forms of operational slack are messy, they 
offer some intriguing patterns. Labor productivity slack does not seem to play a role in 
the decision to breach (or not), but inventory and capacity utilization both seemingly 




for firms performing below historical and social aspirations but increases the likelihood 
of a breach for a firm performing above historical aspirations. Capacity slack has the 
opposite outcomes.  
We posit that when a firm is performing poorly and has excess inventory, it can turn 
that inventory into sales by either selling it or being able to create finished products 
without having to buy additional materials. In other words, poorly performing firms can 
run down inventory and improve performance. However, our conjecture for firms 
performing above their historical aspirations is that if they have excess inventory 
relative to their competitors, it is not the right inventory to turn into sales. In other words 
they are already selling more than their historical average, so if they have inventory it 
is likely not the right inventory and hence cannot be used. Excess inventory slack for 
firms performing above historical aspirations may be an indication of previous poor 
decisions and stranded assets. The money and space tied up in inventory reduces their 
options and may explain why having inventory increases their likelihood of breaching. 
Capacity could work in the opposite manner. Hence, a firm performing above its 
historical average that still has excess capacity can likely use that capacity to create 
more products from the same assets. However, firms performing poorly with excess 
capacity may not have the right capacity. Once more previous poor decisions may mean 
that money, operators, and/or space are tied up in the wrong capacity, reducing, not 
increasing, the options available to improve performance. These explanations are 
offered as our best conjectures. They do not address the possibility that having excess 




do suggest that future research needs to differentiate between the forms of slack and 
explore the possibility that slack might actually create constraints not options. 
Secondary data are useful for exploring irresponsible behavior given the likelihood 
that primary data would be either difficult to collect or highly biased. However, 
secondary data are limited in that they cannot address how or whether firms incorporate 
probabilities into their calculations of the possible gains or losses from compliance or 
non-compliance (March and Shapira, 1987). Also, the timing of the actual decision(s) 
to breach is unknown. Finally, secondary data cannot tease out whether firms breach 
intentionally. Therefore, future research needs to explore how operations managers 
think about risk when making decisions about possible irresponsible behavior.  
This is an easy suggestion to make, but the reality is that future research will have 
trouble addressing how operations managers make decisions about irresponsible 
behavior using primary data. One path for future research could be to build on 
DuHadway et al. (2018) to explore other risky, but legal, actions for indirect insight 
into irresponsible behavior. Experimental research, especially scenario-based  research 
might also be able to offer insights into how doing well, especially relative to 
competitors, influences decision making.  
 
5.1 Implications for theory 
We know the firms in the sample were caught and convicted of breaching EHS 
regulations. We also know that in this sample, as in previous studies, the likelihood of 




performance. What the results do not directly address is why firms performing above 
aspirations act irresponsibly.  
We propose that our results do not support the loss aversion explanation for how 
firms performing above aspirations would frame the choice to breach EHS regulations. 
Instead the results are most consistent with the suggestion that hubris is the process 
underpinning the choice to breach when doing well (e.g., Tarakci et al., 2018). We reach 
this conclusion based on the following. First, in our data, performing better than 
competitors is the stronger trigger of irresponsible behavior. Hubris is a belief that the 
firm can do things others cannot—a social comparison. This is reinforced by the results 
of H4. Specifically, while the role of slack is complex, for the firms performing above 
social aspirations slack does not moderate the decision to breach. Our results indicate 
that the small percentage of firms that breach when performing relatively well do so 
even if they have slack resources. Second, the differences between firms with single 
and multiple locations also point in this direction. The manager of a single facility in a 
multiple-location firm can attribute poor performance to others in the firm while 
attributing success to their own skill (Audia and Brion, 2007; Tarakci et al., 2018). 
Operations managers in single-location firms would be less likely to have this option, 
which could explain why at multiple locations firms’ poor performance is less likely to 
trigger a breach. The results do not support loss aversion and suggest that hubris is the 
likely explanation as to why a small number of firms who perform better than their 





Hubris may explain why a small percentage of firms that are doing relatively well 
decide to breach. However, the findings for performing above aspirations still run 
counter to the predictions of PT. Both the BTF and PT are well established and have 
strong empirical support. Yet the research on firms performing above their aspirational 
level of performance frequently has findings that do not fit into PT or that require strong 
assumptions to use PT to explain firms’ decision making (e.g., Mishina et al., 2010).  
We made three simplifying assumptions to use PT. First, as previously mentioned 
we simplified a mixed gamble into a pure gamble. Second, the BTF is about how a firm 
makes decisions. The BTF does not predict that there is always a single conscious 
decision to breach. It is also possible that a series of individual decisions, which might 
be made by multiple managers, lead to the firm being in breach. PT is formulated for a 
single decision and decision maker. To simplify the hypotheses development we treated 
breaching (or not) as a single discrete decision.  
Third, to use PT at the firm level means assuming that managers behave the same 
when making firm and individual decisions. Recent research in supply chain risk 
management shows that individuals make different decisions for the organization about 
risk than they would for themselves (DuHadway et al., 2018). The operations manager 
who delays needed maintenance may do so with the hope of increasing their own bonus. 
In other words from the manager’s perspective the choice is framed as a choice between 
the status quo of a certain personal gain (of nothing) if they comply and an uncertain 
but greater personal gain (achieving the bonus) if they delay maintenance and nothing 




cost of maintenance) verses an uncertain but much greater loss when the equipment 
does break.  
These far-from- trivial assumptions, our results, and the similar results of others all 
suggest that while PT and the BTF share similarities they are aimed at fundamentally 
different levels of analysis and that what holds for individuals may not hold for 
organizations (e.g., Bromiley et al., 2001; DuHadway et al., 2018). When studying 
group- or firm-level decision making, we suggest that the BTF is a better choice.  
Further exploring hubris and simultaneously addressing individual and 
organizational (risky) decision making are the research’s specific contributions to the 
BTF and its relationship with PT. The research also makes a pair of more general 
theoretical contributions. First, while the BTF has been used in previous operations 
management research (e.g., Kirchoff et al., 2016), its use is not common. Our results 
suggest that the BTF should play a more prominent role in explaining operations 
management decision making and that operational decisions need to be explored in light 
of both the firm’s own historical performance and the performance of the firm’s peers. 
Second, the operations management literature has mainly explored sustainability from 
the perspective of becoming more sustainable or responsible. Furthermore, much of the 
focus has been on the relationship between profits and becoming more sustainable, with 
a general conclusion that it pays to be more sustainable (e.g., Montabon et al., 2016). 
Our results, along with those of Kirchoff et al. (2016) indicate that sustainable 
operations theorizing is missing not just irresponsible or unsustainable behavior but that 




sustainable operations then needs to consider irresponsible behavior and that even firms 
whose financial performance is above average might have incentives to behave 
irresponsibly.  
 
5.2 Implications for practice and policy 
The results also have multiple implications for managers trying to prevent 
irresponsible behavior in their operations or supply chain. The BTF and our results 
suggest that top managers need to be cognizant of the fact that irresponsible behavior 
could manifest when things are going well and that their top performers, especially in 
a multi-facility company, may also be the ones most likely to behave irresponsibly.  
We also identified that having slack resources does not seem to prevent irresponsible 
behavior, especially in firms performing well. This is an important finding for top 
management that is trying to build or maintain a responsible business. Thus, other 
processes and controls, such as certifications (Lo et al., 2014), need to be considered. 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that only a small percentage of firms in the population 
breached. The majority of firms did not, irrespective of their relative performance. 
Nevertheless, this small percentages of firms is having a detrimental effect on the 
environment and workers’ health and safety.  
The results also have implications for policy. Regulators have typically focused their 
efforts on firms in dirty or dangerous industries. But the present research, along with 
other recent studies, such as Wiengarten et al. (2017), suggests that enforcement can be 




we would expect most regulators to intuitively conclude that poor performers could 
take risks at the expense of their workers or the environment, the likelihood of top 
performers also behaving irresponsibly is probably not their conjecture; our results 
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Figures A to G illustrate the slopes of the significant moderating effects of slack. 
The graphs show the change in relation to the aspirational level of ROA and the 
likelihood of an EHS breach based on having a mean score of the moderator 
(standardized according to industry), a high score of the moderator (one standard 
deviation above the mean), and a low score of the moderator (one standard deviation 
below the mean). The x-axis is the level of aspirational ROA from -0.5% to 0 (for ROA 
below aspirational performance) and from 0 to 0.5% (for ROA above aspirational 
performance). The y-axis is the probability of an EHS breach, where 0% is set as the 
probability of a breach occurring when the ROA is exactly at the aspiration level.  
Figures A and B illustrate the attenuating effects of inventory slack for firms with 
an ROA below historical and social aspirations. Moving from the mean to one standard 
deviation below the mean of inventory turnover (an increase in inventory slack), the 
slope of ROA below historical (social) aspiration changes -134.06% (-34.34%). Figure 
C illustrates the attenuating effect of labor slack for firms with an ROA below social 
aspirations. Moving from the mean to one standard deviation below the mean of labor 
productivity (an increase in labor slack), the slope of ROA below social aspiration 
changes -24.20%. Figure D illustrates the attenuating effects of production capacity 
slack for firms with an ROA above historical aspirations. Moving from the mean to one 
standard deviation below the mean of utilization (an increase in capacity slack), the 
slope of ROA above historical aspiration changes -141.75%.  
Figures E through G, however, illustrate that increases in slack could also have 
amplification effects. Figures E and F illustrate that decreasing capacity utilization 




aspirations. Moving from the mean to one standard deviation below the mean of 
capacity utilization, the slope of ROA below historical (social) aspirations changes  
63.94% (9.65%). Figure G illustrates that decreasing inventory turnover (increasing 
slack) amplifies the negative effect of ROA above historical aspiration. Moving from 
the mean to one standard deviation below the mean of inventory turnover, the slope of 
ROA above historical aspiration changes 305.86% 
 
 
Appendix B  
We conducted a number of additional tests to examine the validity and boundaries 
of our results. The primary analysis used a spline function methodology to assess the 
different slopes of relative performance below and above aspirations (Greve, 1998). 
The V-shapes (as illustrated in Figure 2) that we found indicate that the likelihood of 
having a breach increases as performance deviates (both above and below) from 
aspirations. As a robustness check, we explored whether a U-shape can also be used to 
describe these relationships. We entered aspirational performance (historical and 
social) and their squared terms into Model 1 in Table 2. The results are shown in 
Appendix B Table A. The squared terms for both historical and social aspirational 
performance are significantly positive (p < .01). The results are also plotted in 
Appendix B Figures A and B. This test suggests a U-shape can also describe the 
relationship between relative performance and breaching EHS regulations. However 
this approach hides some of the nuance of the differing slopes for above and below 
aspirational performance.  
The sample includes firms with multiple breaches in the same year or across multiple 
years. These firms may have been specifically targeted by regulators, which would 




firms may also learn from past breaches, reducing the odds of future beaches 
(Haunschild and Rhee, 2004). To explore these possibilities and increase the confidence 
in our main results, we conducted three additional analyses. First, we added the 
additional control variable of breach history (measured as number of breaches before 
year t) to the analysis. This additional control did not change our results. Second, we 
eliminated the firms with multiple breaches in the same year and re-ran the models. The 
results (shown in Appendix B Table B) remain consistent with the results in Table 2. 
This analysis indicates that our main results were not biased by the firms with multiple 
breaches in the same year. Third, we eliminated firms with multiple breaches in a single 
or multiple years and re-ran the models. The results (shown in Appendix B Table C) 
are also consistent with the results in Table 2. Thus, we conclude that our main results 
were not biased by firms that had breaches in multiple years. 
In our matching process, we controlled for firm size and confirmed that the 
difference between sample and control firms was non-significant. However, it might 
still be possible that our results are dependent on the variation in firm size in the sample. 
Thus, we conducted an additional analysis where firm size is included as a moderator 
(shown in Appendix B Table D). The coefficients for relative performance × firm size 
are not significant (p > .1) in Models 1, 3, and 4 and negative and marginally significant 
(p < .1) in Model 2. Thus, the results are generally consistent for large and small firms.  
We also explored whether the effect of relative performance varies between firms 
with single and multiple facilities. We repeated the analysis for these two subsamples 
separately and present the results in Appendix B Table E. Model 1 includes the sample 
for firms with a single facility. The coefficients of performance below both historical 
and social aspirations remain significantly negative (p < .01). In addition, the 




while above historical aspiration is non-significant (p > .1). Model 2 includes the 
sample for firms with multiple facilities. The coefficients of performance below 
historical and social aspirations are non-significant (p > .1). The coefficients of 
performance above historical and social aspirations are positive and significant (p < 
.01). These results suggest differences in operational managers’ decision making 
between firms with single and multiple facilities. Firms with a single facility are 
generally more likely to breach the more performance deviates from aspirational levels. 
However, for firms with multiple facilities, responding with a breach only occurs when 
performance is above aspirational levels. These analyses provide interesting and 
important additional insights to the main results. 
In our primary analysis, environmental and safety breaches were aggregated as one 
dependent variable. However, the effects of relative financial performance on the 
likelihood of environmental and safety breaches may differ. Thus, we disaggregated 
the breaches into environmental and safety breaches. The dependent variable of EHS 
breaches was replaced by the disaggregated variables environmental and safety 
breaches. The results are displayed in Appendix B Table F. The effect sizes and 
directions of the results in both models are largely analogous to our primary results 
(Table 2, aggregated DV), providing additional support for our initial results. We do 
note that the coefficients of ROA below historical and social aspirations are non-
significant in the environmental breach model while significant in the safety breach 
model, which is likely due to the small number of environmental breaches. We are 
cautious in coming to any conclusions on environmental breaches given the small 
numbers, but future research could explore this further.  
We used probit regression to examine our hypotheses because the inverse Mill’s 




Table 3 by conducting a conditional logistic regression (Yiu et al., 2014). These results 
are displayed in Appendix B Table G. The results are largely identical to the results in 
Table 3. Thus, our results are robust across different estimation methods.  
Finally, historical and social aspirations were operationalized independently on the 
assumption that firms consider both salient but that they need not be perceived 
identically. Additionally, in about one-third of the firms, historical and social 
aspirations were inconsistent, with one above aspirations and the other below. 
Therefore, we separated the matched pairs into two groups—one where the firms have 
consistent historical and social aspirational performance and a second where they have 
inconsistent aspirational performance. We re-ran the analyses for H1 and H2 for these 
two groups and present the results in the Appendix B Tables H and I. Table H presents 
the results for the firms with consistent historical and social aspirational performance, 
while Table I is for firms with inconsistent aspirational performance. The coefficients 
of ROA below historical and social aspirations are significantly negative (p < 0.01), 
and ROA above historical and social aspirations are significantly positive in both tables. 
These results support the assumption that historical and social comparisons are assessed 





Sample firms with breaches  
  Performance vs. Historical aspiration 
  Above Below 
Performance vs. 
Social aspiration 
Above 65 38 
Below 29 55 
Control firms without breaches 
  Performance vs. Historical aspiration 
  Above Below 
Performance vs. 
Social aspiration 
Above 65 41 




















Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations; N = 374 
  
Variables Mean Std. Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 EHS Breach 0.500 0.501                               
2 ROA below historical aspiration -0.026 0.046 -0.09                             
3 ROA above historical aspiration 0.030 0.052 0.01 0.31                           
4 ROA below social aspiration -0.146 0.571 0.00 0.05 0.06                         
5 ROA above social aspiration 0.105 0.365 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.01                       




-0.007 0.691 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02                   
8 Inventory turnover (standardized) -0.108 0.613 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.10                 
9 Labor productivity (standardized) 0.075 0.550 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.18 0.09 0.01               
10 Berry ratio 1.431 0.866 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.13 0.17 0.01 0.42             
11 Wages per employee (log) 3.267 0.268 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 0.15 0.08 0.37 0.11 0.25 0.18 0.17           
12 Firm size (log) 5.556 1.227 0.14 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.04         
13 Administrative expenses 35.063 31.893 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.39 0.09 0.25 0.18 -0.11 0.47 -0.11       
14 Ownership 0.091 0.224 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.26 -0.05     
15 Compensation 0.908 0.080 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.04   





Table 3: Probit regression analysis of EHS breach (direct effects)  
 Dependent variable: breach at year t (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
N = 374 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Independent variables Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Below historical aspiration    -9.715 2.818 0.001          
Below social aspiration       -10.279 3.187 0.001       
Above historical aspiration          6.635 2.354 0.005    
Above social aspiration             12.765 2.560 0.000 
Working capital 0.194 0.150 0.196 0.218 0.152 0.152 0.228 0.143 0.111 0.256 0.147 0.082 0.265 0.158 0.095 
Production capacity utilization 0.217 0.183 0.236 0.337 0.160 0.036 0.272 0.158 0.085 0.212 0.154 0.170 0.115 0.160 0.471 
Inventory turnover -0.166 0.190 0.384 -0.260 0.326 0.425 -0.176 0.271 0.516 -0.121 0.276 0.662 -0.241 0.376 0.520 
Labor productivity -0.263 0.241 0.275 -0.439 0.244 0.072 -0.229 0.228 0.315 -0.361 0.232 0.120 -0.426 0.262 0.104 
Firm size 1.522 0.197 0.000 1.739 0.252 0.000 1.487 0.238 0.000 1.597 0.240 0.000 1.657 0.248 0.000 
Berry ratio 0.170 0.152 0.264 0.014 0.198 0.945 0.250 0.158 0.114 0.103 0.172 0.549 -0.052 0.220 0.814 
Wages per employee -1.422 0.540 0.008 -1.176 0.560 0.036 -1.434 0.554 0.010 -1.293 0.553 0.019 -1.470 0.575 0.011 
Administrative expenses 0.016 0.004 0.000 0.014 0.005 0.003 0.014 0.005 0.006 0.014 0.005 0.002 0.017 0.005 0.001 
Ownership -0.386 0.528 0.464 -0.147 0.526 0.780 -0.190 0.507 0.707 -0.329 0.510 0.519 -0.418 0.535 0.435 
Compensation 1.575 1.448 0.277 0.347 1.302 0.790 1.085 1.269 0.393 1.526 1.257 0.225 1.445 1.287 0.261 
Inversed Mill's ratio 9.801 2.581 0.000 18.011 3.247 0.000 12.167 2.633 0.000 13.619 2.832 0.000 5.967 2.594 0.021 
Pair dummies Included   Included   Included   Included   Included   
Chi2 97.14   120.12   109.66   106.31   132.96   
R2 18.93%   23.17%   21.15%   20.50%   25.64%   






Table 4: Moderating effects for ROA below historical aspiration 
N = 374 Coef. S.E. p 
Below historical aspiration -17.132 3.990 0.000 
Below historical aspiration × Production capacity utilization 15.852 6.019 0.008 
Below historical aspiration × Inventory turnover -37.465 13.188 0.005 
Below historical aspiration × Labor productivity 16.474 10.211 0.107 
Working capital 0.237 0.148 0.108 
Production capacity utilization 0.594 0.182 0.001 
Inventory turnover -0.692 0.393 0.078 
Labor productivity -0.004 0.384 0.992 
Firm size 1.772 0.219 0.000 
Berry ratio -0.141 0.232 0.544 
Wages per employee -1.433 0.593 0.016 
Administrative expenses 0.013 0.005 0.004 
Ownership -0.103 0.546 0.850 
Compensation 1.288 1.656 0.437 
Inversed Mill's ratio 18.722 3.495 0.000 
R2 27.39%   
 
 
Table 5: Moderating effects for ROA below social aspiration 
N = 374 Coef. S.E. p 
Below social aspiration -15.891 3.645 0.000 
Below social aspiration × Production capacity utilization 2.220 0.567 0.000 
Below social aspiration × Inventory turnover -8.903 2.711 0.001 
Below social aspiration × Labor productivity -6.991 1.931 0.000 
Working capital 0.281 0.165 0.088 
Production capacity utilization 0.266 0.173 0.126 
Inventory turnover -0.342 0.178 0.055 
Labor productivity -0.261 0.260 0.314 
Firm size (Employee) 1.443 0.210 0.000 
Berry ratio 0.353 0.177 0.046 
Wages per employee -1.644 0.559 0.003 
Administrative expenses 0.013 0.004 0.003 
Ownership -0.386 0.541 0.476 
Compensation 1.047 1.520 0.491 
Inversed Mill's ratio 11.712 2.697 0.000 







Table 6: Moderating effects for ROA above historical aspiration 
N = 374 Coef. S.E. p 
Above historical aspiration 3.931 2.691 0.144 
Above historical aspiration × Production capacity utilization 8.049 3.347 0.016 
Above historical aspiration × Inventory turnover -19.615 6.968 0.005 
Above historical aspiration × Labor productivity -0.684 4.112 0.868 
Working capital 0.262 0.159 0.099 
Production capacity utilization -0.281 0.261 0.283 
Inventory turnover 0.200 0.135 0.139 
Labor productivity -0.314 0.327 0.338 
Firm size (Employee) 1.618 0.215 0.000 
Berry ratio 0.029 0.166 0.863 
Wages per employee -1.393 0.581 0.016 
Administrative expenses 0.014 0.004 0.001 
Ownership -0.414 0.535 0.439 
Compensation 1.762 1.530 0.249 
Inversed Mill's ratio 14.870 3.342 0.000 
R2 24.28%   
 
Table 7: Moderating effects for ROA above social aspiration 
N = 374 Coef. S.E. p 
Above social aspiration 13.014 2.675 0.000 
Above social aspiration × Production capacity utilization -6.075 5.681 0.285 
Above social aspiration × Inventory turnover -2.536 3.084 0.411 
Above social aspiration × Labor productivity -0.143 1.838 0.938 
Working capital 0.286 0.158 0.070 
Production capacity utilization 0.181 0.197 0.360 
Inventory turnover -0.078 0.324 0.810 
Labor productivity -0.280 0.305 0.358 
Firm size (Employee) -0.114 0.215 0.594 
Berry ratio -1.543 0.569 0.007 
Wages per employee 1.646 0.221 0.000 
Administrative expenses 0.017 0.004 0.000 
Ownership -0.519 0.578 0.369 
Compensation 1.506 1.503 0.316 
Inversed Mill's ratio 6.497 2.623 0.013 







Table 8: Results summary 
 Hypothesis 3—Below aspirational performance Hypotheses 4—Above aspirational performance 
 Below Historical (Table 4) Below Social (Table 5)  Above Historical (Table 6) Above Social (Table 7) 
ROA × Inventory More slack reduces the 
likelihood of a breach 
 
Supports H3 
More slack reduces the 
likelihood of a breach 
 
Supports H3 
More slack increases the 







ROA × Labor 
productivity 
Not significant More slack reduces the 











ROA × Capacity 
utilization 
More slack increases the 
likelihood of a breach 
 
Opposite of H3 
More slack increases 
the likelihood of a 
breach 
 
Opposite of H3 
More slack reduces the 
likelihood of a breach 
 
















Figure 2: Relationship between ROA (current performance) and aspirations and the likelihood of EHS breach. (The likelihood of a breach when 










































Figure A:	Moderating effect of inventory turnover on the relationship between ROA 
(current performance) below historical aspiration and the likelihood of EHS breach. 





Figure B:	Moderating effect of inventory turnover on the relationship between ROA 
(current performance) below social aspiration and the likelihood of EHS breach. (The 


















































Figure C:	Moderating effect of labor productivity on the relationship between ROA 
(current performance) below social aspiration and the likelihood of EHS breach. (The 
likelihood of a breach when ROA is at the social aspiration level is benchmarked at 
zero.)	 
	
Figure D:	Moderating effect of capacity utilization on the relationship between ROA 
(current performance) above historical aspiration and the likelihood of EHS breach. 




































Figure E:	Moderating effect of capacity utilization on the relationship between ROA 
(current performance) below historical aspiration and the likelihood of EHS breach. 




Figure F:	Moderating effect of capacity utilization on the relationship between ROA 
(current performance) below social aspiration and the likelihood of EHS breach. (The 









































Figure G:	Moderating effect of inventory turnover on the relationship between ROA 
(current performance) above historical aspiration and the likelihood of EHS breach. 

























Table A: Curvilinear relationship between relative performance and breach 
DV: EHS breach at year t 
Model 1: Historical aspiration model 
N = 374 Coef. p 
Relative performance (Historical) -4.162 0.009 
Squared Relative performance (Historical) 24.745 0.003 
R2 23.02%  
Model 2: Social aspiration model 
 Coef. p 
Relative performance (Social) -14.278 0.001 
Squared Relative performance (Social) 101.638 0.000 
R2 34.64%  
Note: two-tailed tests; control variables included 
 
 
Table B: Single breach in each year; multiple breaches in the same firm and year eliminated 
 N = 342 DV: EHS breach at year t  
Variables at year t-1 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Below historical aspiration -10.794 0.000             
Above historical aspiration     6.987 0.006         
Below social aspiration         -11.876 0.001     
Above social aspiration             9.486 0.000 
R2 23.02%   21.87%   22.92%   24.07%   










Table C: First breach of firms 
N = 288 DV: EHS breach at year t 
Variables at year t-1 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Below historical aspiration -15.044 0.000             
Above historical aspiration     7.980 0.004         
Below social aspiration         -9.431 0.023     
Above social aspiration             11.720 0.000 
R2 27.79%   23.63%   23.15%   26.29%   





Table D: Moderating effect of firm size 
  DV: EHS breach at year t (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
  
Model 1 
Relative performance  
as ROA below  
historical aspiration 
Model 2 
Relative performance  
as ROA below  
social aspiration 
Model 3  
Relative performance  
as ROA above 
historical aspiration 
Model 4 
Relative performance  
as ROA above  
social aspiration 
Variables at year t-1 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
ROA below aspiration -7.588 0.611 -9.998 0.002         
ROA above aspiration         11.056 0.383 8.065 0.281 
Relative performance × Firm size -0.403 0.881 -0.018 0.051 -0.812 0.723 0.919 0.464 
R2 23.17%   20.53%   21.34%   27.08%   






Table E: Single-facility firms and multiple-facility firms 
  
DV: EHS breach at year t 
Model 1: Single-facility firms 
N = 162 
Variables at year t-1 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Below historical aspiration -14.660 0.001             
Above historical aspiration     1.961 0.571         
Below social aspiration         -14.720 0.002     
Above social aspiration             9.236 0.007 
R2 15.17%   11.01%   16.27%   14.22%   
  
  
Model 2: Multiple-facility firms 
N = 212 
Variables at year t-1 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Below historical aspiration 1.441 0.678             
Above historical aspiration     13.727 0.000         
Below social aspiration         -6.106 0.144     
Above social aspiration             26.287 0.000 
R2 39.56%   35.43%   29.89%   44.52%   
Note: two-tailed tests; control variables included 
 
 
Table F: Probit regression analysis of environmental and safety breach 
  
(1) DV: Environmental breach at year t (2) DV: Safety breach at year t 
N = 66 N = 314  
(1 = yes; 0 = no) (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
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Above social aspiration       -0.052 0.188 

















Note: two-tailed tests; control variables included 
 
 
Table G: Conditional logistic regression analysis of EHS breach 
  DV: EHS breach at year t (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
  
Model 1 
Relative performance  
as ROA below  
historical aspiration 
Model 2 
Relative performance  
as ROA below  
social aspiration 
Model 3  
Relative performance  
as ROA above 
historical aspiration 
Model 4 
Relative performance  
as ROA above  
social aspiration 
Variables at year t-1 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
ROA below aspiration -28.688 0.000 -27.101 0.000         
ROA above aspiration         6.950 0.152 22.197 0.000 
Relative performance × Production capacity utilization 28.826 0.019 3.792 0.000 13.627 0.019 -10.184 0.311 
Relative performance × Labor productivity -62.667 0.004 -14.943 0.002 -34.120 0.014 -3.895 0.508 
Relative performance × Inventory turnover 29.416 0.099 -11.959 0.001 -0.255 0.969 -0.152 0.960 
R2 27.26%   22.92%   24.12%   25.84%   







Table H: Historical and social aspirational performance consistent firms 
 N = 240 DV: EHS breach at year t  
Variables at year t-1 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Below historical aspiration -12.537 0.002             
Above historical aspiration     7.410 0.013         
Below social aspiration         -14.103 0.002     
Above social aspiration             9.648 0.006 
R2 24.18%   23.87%   26.94%   25.98%   























Table I: Historical and social aspirational performances inconsistent firms 
 N = 134 DV: EHS breach at year t  
Variables at year t-1 Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Below historical aspiration -19.578 0.000             
Above historical aspiration     7.694 0.063         
Below social aspiration         -21.776 0.017     
Above social aspiration             14.478 0.002 
R2 40.05%   36.04%   39.77%   39.51%   
































Figure B: Curvilinear relation between social relative performance and likelihood of EHS 
breach 
 
	
 
